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This chapter discusses: 
 
• How applied psychologists attempt to ground their practice in research. 
• The history of the evidence-based practice movement. 
• Problems with the scientist practitioner model 
• Alternative conceptualisations of the link between research evidence 
and practice. 
• Some of the problems with randomised controlled research trials. 
• The social context of research. 
• The need for a different approach, focusing on the views of participants 
and utilising a broader range of research methods. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the distinctive things about applied psychology is that its practitioners are 
engaged in intervening in the world in a variety of ways, providing: psychotherapy; 
health psychology programmes; educational support interventions and so on.  
However, on what basis are these interventions designed?  How can we tell whether 
an intervention has ‘worked’?  How might our interventions be improved?  The 
applied psychologist needs to be able to draw on theory, research and practice in 
order to address such questions but how do these three domains relate to each 
other?  It is on this question that this chapter is focused. 
 
A range of policy initiatives now explicitly stress the importance of basing 
professional practice on firm evidence, what has become known as 'evidence-based 
practice'.  The notion of the applied psychologist as a scientist practitioner is one 
model of relating practice to evidence.  However, such models present a number of 
dilemmas for the applied psychologist.  If we only ever do what is deemed effective 
how do we develop innovative approaches?  If ‘absence of evidence is not evidence 
of ineffectiveness’ (Department of Health, 2001, p.40) how should psychologists work 
when dealing with issues where there is no firm evidence base?  How can knowledge 
of groups help us in deciding how to approach an individual case?  Do practitioners 
really base what they do on the research literature? There are often tensions in this 
debate between practitioners and academic researchers, for example about what 
kind of knowledge counts as evidence.  
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In this chapter, we begin with a review of the history of the evidence-based practice 
movement before examining the scientist practitioner model and alternative 
approaches like the reflective practitioner.  Then we consider some of the 
methodological problems faced in conducting randomised controlled trials in applied 
psychology, using trials of psychological therapy as an example.  Of course, 
judgements about research evidence take place within a social and political context 
and so we investigate this in relation to the work of the National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence (NICE) before looking at how the perspectives of the 
recipients of interventions have been neglected.  We make a case for a more 
pluralistic approach to gathering evidence before discussing examples of applied 
psychologists making use of evidence. 
 
 
The rise of the evidence-based practice movement 
 
The  phrase ‘evidence-based practice’ is now so commonly used it has become a 
cliché but it may surprise some readers how brief a history this concept has had.  
Originally the term "Evidence Based Medicine" was employed and the focus was on 
the individual "patient" (e.g. Sackett et al, 1996).  However, increasingly the 
philosophy and methodology underpinning the approach have been applied to 
decisions on funding for treatments and in areas beyond clinical medicine.   Many 
commentators trace its emergence to the work of epidemiologist Professor Archie 
Cochrane in Cardiff in the 1970s.  During the 1970s and 1980s, however, his ideas 
were taken up by others and, in 1992, the NHS set up the Cochrane Centre which 
aimed to develop systematic reviews of clinical trials.  1993 saw the emergence of an 
international Cochrane Collaboration and, in 1999 the UK’s NICE  was established.  
Similar aims were identified by the Social Science Research Unit based at the 
Institute of Education in London and, more directly in the Evidence for Policy and 
Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre established in 2003. 
For private health insurance companies, especially in the US, evidence-based 
practice provided a means of controlling their costs.  For countries like the UK with a 
publicly-funded health service, evidence-based medicine also offers a way of 
controlling costs to the taxpayer.  Bodies like NICE offer the possibility of providing a 
rational and transparent process for making decisions about interventions, one freed 
from quackery or the influence of lobby groups like the pharmaceutical industry.  
However, as we discuss later in the chapter, these decisions still occur within a 
particular socio-political context. 
 
It would be a mistake to assume that, before these policy developments, practice 
was not informed by research. Indeed, the scientist practitioner model has been a 
dominant identity since the beginnings of applied psychology and so it is to this that 
we turn first. 
 
 
The scientist practitioner model and its critics  
 
This model was developed originally for clinical psychology graduate training 
programmes in the US at a conference in Boulder, Colorado in 1949 but it has 
become a dominant model both in other fields of applied psychology (Hagstrom, Fry, 
Cramblet & Tanner, 2007) and in other countries, including the UK.  One of the 
motivations in developing the model was to train practitioners to apply the scientific 
method to understanding and aiding diagnosis and treatment although in the UK 
clinical psychology became involved in treatment much later than in the US (Pilgrim 
& Treacher, 1992).  It was clear even at the time that this model was essentially a 
compromise position to prevent a split in the young profession between courses 
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which emphasised either the scientist or practitioner side of the model (Pilgrim & 
Treacher, 1992).  Clinical health psychology emerged as a distinct sub-discipline 
later than clinical psychology, but Murray (2010) has suggested that it too follows the 
scientist-practitioner model.  Even sixty years on there is a lively debate in clinical 
psychology about this model (e.g. Clegg, 1998; Lane & Corrie, 2006; John, 1998; 
Long & Hollin, 1997; and Milne & Paxton, 1998). 
 
Does the scientist practitioner model accurately represent applied psychology?   If by 
this we mean ‘do practitioners conduct research which is published in peer-reviewed 
journals?’ then the answer appears to be largely ‘no’.  For example, Norcross et al. 
(1992) noted that the modal number of publications for UK clinical psychologists was 
zero – a well-replicated finding over the years in the UK and US -- with eight per cent 
of clinical psychologists producing approximately half of published work although 
76% had published at least once in their careers.  A similar result has been found in 
the US (Norcross et al., 2005).   
 
There are, of course, many valid reasons why applied psychologists may not be 
research active (Holttum & Goble, 2006) – many employers may prefer psychologists 
to be involved in direct interventions rather than research or consultancy and thus 
Kennedy and Llewelyn (2001) have suggested that the model represents 'an attitude 
to practice rather than a commitment to participation in the academic community' 
(p.77) whilst Milne (1999) differentiates between scientist practitioners and evidence-
based practitioners.    However, even here there are problems as few applied 
psychologists appear to read peer-reviewed research on a regular basis.  For 
example, Milne et al. (1990) reported that only 20% of their sample of UK clinical 
psychologists had read an academic journal each week (although 45% did monthly); 
only 14% attended national scientific conferences; and only 16% thought published 
research had 'a lot' of influence on their work.  Milne et al’s (2000) more recent 
sample of UK psychological therapists had ‘used guidelines and protocols on 56 per 
cent of occasions, had on average drawn on research, CPD and audit approximately 
half of the time, but had been only minimally influenced by research, CPD or audit’ 
(p.8).   It is, perhaps, not surprising that some commentators have argued that 
identifying oneself with the scientist practitioner model may serve the rhetorical 
function of claiming the authority of science whilst in practice research has much less 
impact (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). 
 
One could resolve some of the problems with the scientist practitioner model by 
having a much broader and inclusive notion of 'science' and 'evidence', stepping 
away from simplistically modernist and naively realist views (Lane & Corrie, 2006).  
Larner (2001), advocating a critical practitioner model, has argued that 'the choice is 
not between psychological science and non-science, but between an exclusively 
logical-positivist and a critical science' (p.40).   
 
In recent years, the scientist practitioner model has had competition from Schön's 
(1987) reflective practitioner. This approach was developed following studies where 
expert practitioners were identified by peers and then a consensual understanding 
developed of key elements of their practice.  Interestingly, peers often focused on 
personal qualities such as wisdom, integrity and intuition.  Whilst research-based 
knowledge was accessed during this process it was combined with knowledge of 
other cases which bore some similarity and with subjective, emotional perceptions 
about the particular therapeutic relationship or context (Clegg, 1998).  Here then 
there is an emphasis on an integration of theory, research and practice at a more 
personal level and it also appears to draw on an active philosophy of learning which 
is consistent with previous work on philosophies of learning (e.g. Kolb et al., 1974).    
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Figure 1 about here 
 
 
Although in the US, the scientist practitioner model seems as strong as ever -- in 
clinical psychology at least (Norcross et al., 2005) -- there are signs in the UK that 
things may be changing as reflective practice has become an increasing influence 
(e.g. Stedmon & Dallos, 2009).  For example, an examination in August 2011 of the 
programme descriptions on the website of the UK Clearing House for Postgraduate 
Courses in Clinical Psychology revealed that only five out of 30 programmes 
specifically noted that they followed the scientist practitioner model whereas twice 
that number mentioned both scientist practitioner and reflective practitioner models.  
In a similar vein some health psychology programmes in the UK align themselves 
with a reflective-scientist-practitioner approach (e.g. the University of Surrey).  There 
are also challenges to the scientist-practitioner approach to health psychology from 
critical and community approaches (e.g. Murray, 2010).  Within educational 
psychology the drive to incorporate evidence has been two-fold: the search for 
interventions that have proven efficacy and the need to assure quality of provision 
through the provision of outcome measures (Frederickson, 2002; Dunsmuir, 2009). 
 
One of the differences between the applied scientist of old and current practitioners is 
that the evaluation of the quality of research evidence has become increasingly 
institutionalised.  Bodies such as NICE now recommend interventions for particular 
diagnoses.  Paradoxically, applied psychologists may now be discouraged from 
evaluating the quality of studies for themselves, instead taking a NICE 
recommendation as a proxy of quality.  However, as we will see later in the chapter, 
this may be problematic.  Bodies like NICE make certain assumptions about research 
quality, drawing on the work of the Cochrane Collaboration, viewing it in a 
hierarchical manner – see figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) are at the top of this hierarchy.  In these trials, 
research participants are allocated to different interventions – including a control 
group -- in a randomised fashion.  However they suffer from a number of 
methodological problems and so the next section examines these in more detail, 
using RCTs of psychological therapies as an example. 
 
 
The trouble with trials  -- problems associated with the use of RCTs  
 
A strong form of RCT is the double-blind procedure where neither the research 
participant nor the staff involved in their care should be able to tell what experimental 
condition they are in.  This is because staff knowledge of the condition can introduce 
bias.  However, participants in drug trials can often work out which condition they are 
in from the side effect profile (Moncrieff, in press) and it is possible that many 
participants in psychotherapy RCTs do too, introducing another form of bias. In a 
psychotherapy RCT the therapist certainly knows which condition the participant is in 
and thus there are no double blind RCTs of psychological therapy.  In drugs research 
there is increasing use of the triple blind procedure, where the researcher does not 
know the condition, since even this has been shown to have an effect.  There are no 
triple blind RCTs of psychological therapy. 
 
Moncrieff (in press) notes that other common problems with RCTs include:  biases in 
the selection of participants (e.g. research samples are highly selected); high 
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numbers of participants dropping out of a study over time (sometimes in quite high 
numbers); how findings and analyses are presented; and publication bias (i.e. 
positive findings are more likely both to be submitted for publication and published by 
journals).  Kelly and Moloney (in press) note some more specific problems for 
psychotherapy RCTs including: the difficulty of achieving ‘pure’ randomisation; the 
impact of therapist allegiance effects (the well-replicated finding that therapists have 
better outcomes when giving a therapy with which they have an allegiance); the 
difficulties in achieving fidelity with a therapy; what kind of control group is selected 
(e.g. treatment as usual – a weak comparison – or a potentially powerful alternative 
therapy); and the length of follow-up.  Guy et al (2011) point out that RCTs tend to be 
very expensive to run and thus this puts constraints on who can conduct trials (often 
large university-based collaborations).  Davey et al (in press) note that many RCTs 
focus on symptomatic change in individuals rather than the second order change – 
change within the system (e.g. a family, group or organisation) – on which, for 
example, systemic family therapists focus in their practice.   
 
Over twenty years ago, Stiles and Stiles (1989) critiqued the drug metaphor 
underlying psychotherapy RCTs  -- the idea that an RCT can help determine the 
‘active ingredient’ in a therapy in the same way as determining the active chemical in 
a drug.  In psychotherapy RCTs the relational context in which therapeutic  
conversations take place is not considered.  Moreover, there is a focus on comparing 
different ‘brand name’ therapies like cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) or 
psychodynamic therapy.  One could argue that many RCTs obscure research 
progress since they tend to focus on the relatively small differences between, say, 
CBT and supportive counselling for people with psychotic experiences, rather than 
examining the larger common factors shared between these different therapeutic 
approaches (Paley & Shapiro, 2002; Shapiro & Paley, 2002) but proponents argue 
that equivalence between therapies may be a methodological artefact (Tarrier et al., 
2002).  However, whichever is the case, there are still some quite fundamental 
questions which have not been fully addressed – for example are cognitive strategies 
the active ingredient in CBT?  Longmore and Worrell (2007), in their review, argue 
that the cognitive components of CBT do not appear to add anything to the 
behavioural components and thus are not necessary components of CBT..   
 
There are also problems of generalizability. RCTs tend to focus on the narrow issue 
of efficacy (whether an intervention ‘works’ in a highly controlled setting with a highly 
selected research population) rather than effectiveness (whether an intervention 
‘works’ in the real world, making a real difference in a person’s everyday life). In fact 
there are vastly more studies of efficacy conducted than of effectiveness (Cahill et 
al., 2010).  Since RCTs are based on group means they tell us very little about 
individuals but, in practice, applied psychologists need to be able to work out what 
will help them in a particular situation.  A related problem is the number of 
combinations of treatment that can be compared within an RCT.  In routine clinical 
practice interventions are frequently combined but trials rarely evaluate more than 
two (Marks, 2009), and it is easy to see why.  If one wished to evaluate 5 different 
techniques in combination, for example, 120 different combinations would be 
required.  The issue of the clinical or practical significance of trial findings is an 
increasingly important topic – see the March 2010 issue of Clinical Psychology:  
Science and Practice.  Roth (1999) has suggested the introduction of clinically 
meaningful analyses like the number needed to treat (NNT) criterion – that is, how 
many people would need to receive the experimental condition for one person to gain 
a benefit they would not have obtained from receiving the control condition.  
However, Shearer-Underhill and Marker’s (2010) analysis of 100 randomly selected 
papers published in the APA’s Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 
between 2000-2008 revealed that only four reported this statistic.  Nevertheless, 
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while analyses such as NNT are more helpful to clinicians making decisions about 
individuals than group means they do not resolve some of the fundamental limitations 
of RCTs. 
 
The dependence of bodies like NICE on RCTs is thus problematic but, of course, 
bodies like these do not evaluate evidence in a social and political vacuum.  Indeed 
as policymakers and public sector employers have increasingly sought to ensure that 
guidelines are followed by practitioners, judgements about evidence have become 
increasingly politicised and so it is to this issue that we turn next. 
 
 
The social context of evidence-based practice:  A NICE example 
 
One of the problems with evidence-based policy-making is that the social context 
within which evidence gets produced can be obscured.  Marks (2009) has argued 
that "In truth, evidence consists of negotiable, value-laden and contextually 
dependent items of information.  The evidence (= knowledge) base in science, 
medicine and health care is not an accident, but the outcome of a heuristic set of 
"gates" or "filters"." (P.476).  Research evidence does not just appear – researchers 
need to decide to research a particular topic and this will be dependent on what 
topics research funders are prepared to fund.  Research funders may be influenced 
by issues other than the epidemiological importance of a problem.  For example, in 
one of his Reith lectures Lord Martin Rees criticised the fact that health and 
pharmaceutical research expenditures were ‘much, much higher’ than the ‘five trillion 
dollars a year’ spent on research into energy which, he argued, was arguably a more 
pressing need because of climate change (Rees, 2010).  This contrast is heightened 
because much pharmaceutical research is focused on products likely to be profitable 
and so, although malaria is a massive international problem, pharmaceutical 
companies were initially unwilling to develop cheap anti-malarial medication until 
extensive campaigning forced them to do otherwise (Crawford, 2007).  Much health 
research is funded by charities and the ability of a charity to generate money may 
depend a lot on the emotional appeal of a particular issue.   
 
A great deal of research is funded by governments.  Governments have a range of 
priorities – for example, worldwide military spending in 2010 was $1.6 trillion 
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2011).  Government funding will 
be related to policy priorities and because politicians tend to work on electoral 
timescales of 4-5 years, policy initiatives may move ahead of the research evidence.  
Thus, for example, the UK government spent £200m setting up new cognitive 
behavioural treatment services for people with a diagnosis of personality disorder 
who were also considered dangerous potential offenders (so-called DSPD) in 
advance of research demonstrating their efficacy.  Subsequently, the researchers 
involved with the DSPD programme have noted that it ‘has been less effective in 
managing those whom it was primarily targeting and may not have been cost-
effective’ (Tyrer et al., 2010, p.95).   
 
NICE provides a good example of the social context of evidence-based practice.  For 
a start, it doesn’t choose the topics on which it will develop guidelines – these are 
decided by Ministers (though obviously with input from advisers)1
                                           
1 Limitations of space prohibit a fuller discussion of the way in which evidence is utilised by 
policy-makers – see Stevens (2011) for a fascinating account of one academic researcher’s 
experience of being seconded to work in a UK government department. 
.  Moreover, the 
topics are ‘conditions’ and thus the process is based on a medical diagnostic 
framework even though the guidelines for many of the mental health problems 
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specifically note that the reliability and validity of many of these diagnoses are 
contested (e.g. the guidelines on borderline personality disorder and depression).  
The Midlands Psychology Group (2010) note that the 2006 NICE guideline on 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) includes the developers’ response to 
a submission by the Critical Psychiatry Network: 
 
Thank you very much for your comprehensive and detailed critique of the 
concept, diagnosis, classification and treatment of ADHD and related 
categories. Unfortunately, we are unable to dismiss the diagnosis as we 
would be left without a guideline to undertake. (NICE, 2006, p.34) 
 
 
Once a topic has been selected, NICE then sets up Guideline Development Groups 
(GDGs). Guy et al. (2011) has criticised the composition of these groups, noting that 
the membership of the GDGs for the 2004 guidelines for anxiety and the 2009 
guidelines for depression and schizophrenia were composed of:  6.7% psychological 
therapists; 10.7% service users or carers; 33% representatives of the medical 
profession; and 36%  staff from the National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health 
(NCCMH) led by a partnership between the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the 
British Psychological Society’s Centre for Outcomes Research and Effectiveness.  
Winter (2010) notes that, of the psychological therapy professionals included on 
mental health-related GDGs, the ‘majority were cognitive behavioural in their 
therapeutic orientation’ (2010, p.6).  He argues that allegiance effects are evident in 
the work of research reviewers like the GDGs.  Citing examples of alleged bias in 
their work he comments: 
 
It is difficult not to conclude that such recommendations are based less on a 
balanced review of the evidence base than on the allegiances of members of 
the Guideline Development Group or political considerations, such as support 
of current National Health Service (NHS) policies and initiatives. 
 
Winter (2010, p.6) 
 
 
Moreover, not all perspectives are given equal weight in GDG deliberations.  Milewa 
reports, based on his interviews with NICE participants, that non-professional 
members ‘were more likely to have their credibility or legitimacy questioned openly’ 
(2006, p.3108).  Indeed the two service user representatives on the self harm GDG 
resigned because they felt the group was unwilling to question aspects of 
assessment and treatment (Midlands Psychology Group, 2010; Pembroke, undated).   
 
Reviews of the research evidence are based on the hierarchical framework described 
earlier.  However, Milewa and Barry (2005) note that NICE committees take into 
account a wide variety of considerations.  For example, the GDG for antisocial 
personality disorder, finding that there was little RCT evidence in the area, instead 
drew on research into offending behaviour programmes.   
 
Once the guidelines have been agreed they are published in four different versions.  
Learmonth (2006) notes that there are important differences between these versions:  
 
The Quick Reference Guide and shortened Guidelines are essentially 
synopses of the full Guidelines, but with all caveats and ambiguities removed. 
The effect of this is to make them read as hugely more ‘authoritative’ 
statements of fact, whereas the full Guidelines allow for far more questioning 
of both process and outcome. (p.2).  
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The Department of Health then seeks to ensure, through managerial and policy 
directives, that only recommended interventions are utilised and NHS managers 
often simply carry this out, rather than refer to the full, and more nuanced, versions of 
the guidelines.  Typically, for the mental health guidelines, only interventions with 
RCTs are recommended. Roth (1999) has warned of the dangers of going down the 
US path of identifying ‘empirically supported therapies’ because of the way this has 
been used to restrict practice, especially by managed-care organisations.  In the 
NHS there has been more of an emphasis on the development of clinical guidelines 
which involve both evidence and professional opinion (e.g. Roth & Fonagy, 2004) 
but, increasingly room for discretion and for tailoring interventions for particular users 
of services has been removed. 
 
 
Whose evidence?  The need to include the perspectives of participants 
 
It is noteworthy that the views of those who receive interventions are placed at the 
bottom of the Cochrane Collaboration’s hierarchy of evidence.  Indeed, Marks (2009) 
has argued that "In medicine and health care there is a large and increasing gap 
between what gets measured and what matters most to clients and patients" (P. 
476).  Perkins (2001), a mental health professional and mental health service user 
has noted that one of the problems with the way the outcomes of mental health 
interventions are usually measured is that they tend to focus only on the reduction of 
psychiatric symptoms.  She argues that a narrow focus on symptoms alone is a 
professional perspective and that this may not be the only or even the most important 
criterion of success from a service user's point of view -- often they are more 
interested in issues relating to quality of life. She suggests that services need to 
systematically ascertain the goals of service users (as they define them) and accord 
them the status currently enjoyed by the views of professionals and she questions 
whether many interventions would look effective if outcome was measured by service 
users’ scores on scales like Rogers et al.,’s  (1997) measurement of empowerment.  
Rose et al (2006) concur, asking ‘who decides what is evidence, or more precisely, 
whose versions of evidence are given priority?’ (p.110).  They argue that the 
evidence gathered in relation to interventions is contestable from the viewpoint of 
different stakeholders (e.g. service users and carers, professionals, policymakers 
etc) and that researchers thus need to incorporate multiple perspectives.  They noted 
that service users often had important views that were at variance with those of 
professionals, citing, as an example Rose et al’s (2003) study of service user 
perspectives on Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT).  This had found that service users 
gave much lower ratings of satisfaction for ECT compared with ratings collected in 
ECT trials and that about a third of those who had signed consent forms for ECT felt 
their consent had not been willingly given.  Moreover, the measures of outcome were 
defined by what professionals considered important, not necessarily what service 
users did.  The importance of attending to the views and experiences of service 
users is given additional emphasis by the recent focus in the UK on the importance of 
shared decision-making in relation to testing and interventions of various sorts (e.g. 
Coulter and Collins, 2011).  This is a process in which clinicians and service 
users/patients work together to determine a course of action.  While it is generally 
conceptualised as occurring in the context of a consultation it clearly entails a central 
role for the "consumer" of the intervention and thus has implications for research as 
well as good clinical practice.  It is thus important in any study for applied 
psychologists to consider the perspectives of a range of stakeholders, especially 
those who receive our interventions.   
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A pluralistic approach to gathering evidence 
 
So far we have argued that a reliance on RCTs, studies of efficacy rather than 
effectiveness, statistical rather than clinical or practical significance, and 
professional- rather than participant-derived views and measures of outcome is 
problematic.  Cornish and Gillespie (2009) have argued that the traditional hierarchy 
of evidence, with meta-analyses and RCTs at the top, reflects the prioritisation of a 
particular set of interests.  RCTs, despite their limitations, are helpful to policymakers 
and purchasers of healthcare.  They are less helpful, as we have seen, to 
practitioners making decisions about particular clients and to those wishing to 
understand the views of service users or the role of social and cultural factors in 
health and illness.  There is a need both for researchers and independent 
gatekeepers like NICE to adopt a more pluralistic approach to evidence and a 
number of suggestions have been made in the literature.  Indeed, in a report on 
evidence-based practice Marks (2002) concluded, amongst other things, that it was 
necessary to "broaden the epistemological approach and evidence-base, and create 
more inclusive methods for synthesis of evidence" (P. 45).   Hoshmand and 
Polkinghorne (1992) have talked of the need for new forms of knowledge and enquiry 
-- a 'knowledge of practice' (p.60) and, indeed, practice-based research has become 
increasingly popular as have effectiveness studies (e.g. Cahill et al., 2010).  Roth 
(1999) has noted that much psychotherapy research continues to focus on 
comparisons between ‘brand name’ therapies and he has called for the further 
development of pan-theoretical research focusing on factors like the importance of 
the therapeutic alliance and the skilfullness with which interventions are implemented 
(see Norcross & Goldfried, 2005; and Prochaska & Norcross, 2009 for introductions 
to this kind of approach). 
 
A number of commentators have argued for a greater role for qualitative research in 
applied psychology.  For example, within the realm of psychotherapy, qualitative 
methods can provide an insight into change processes (Elliott, 2012; McLeod, 2011) 
or how people’s engagement with services changes across time (McKenna & Todd, 
1997) or how theoretical propositions are enacted in therapy (Roy-Chowdhury, 
2003).  There are some challenges, however.  For example, a range of interventions 
are not based on modernist realist premises.  Here, however, new forms of 
evaluation like the Most Significant Change technique2
 
 (Dart & Davies, 2003) can be 
useful.  In this approach a range of stakeholders identify key domains within which 
change is desired from an intervention programme and there is then a consensual 
search for specific stories identifying change within these domains.  This has proven 
to be a popular method for evaluating a variety of programmes, particular in 
community development as it explicitly includes a range of stakeholders and is 
sensitive to social impacts. 
There is a danger though in leaving evaluation just up to researchers and bodies like 
NICE.  Practitioners too have a role both in consuming research (see Falzon et al., 
2010 for an example of how practitioners can search the evidence base themselves) 
and also in evaluating their own work.  Many organisations employing applied 
psychologists may gather data useful for evaluation but, as practitioners, we have an 
ethical duty to evaluate our own practice in a manner consistent with our approach.  
Here single case designs can be helpful but ‘quick and dirty’ approaches can also be 
enlightening and some practitioners have conducted simple audits of their work (e.g. 
Holmes, 2003).  A quantitative approach can be useful for evaluating change over 
time but this need not be dependent on a modernist realist epistemology.  For 
                                           
2 We are indebted to Angela Byrne for alerting us to this technique. 
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example, within mental health settings, simple ecologically valid scaling measures 
can be used which are not dependent on psychiatric diagnostic categories.  For 
example in Shapiro’s Personal Questionnaire technique (Shapiro, 1961) the client is 
asked to describe, in their own words, a particular problematic experience or 
‘complaint’ (or ‘symptom’ within a diagnostic framework).  Each complaint is then 
given a simple rating scale and so the client can be asked to give a rating over the 
course of an intervention (e.g. Barkham et al., 1989). A similar approach is adopted 
within solution-focused work, where scaling questions can be used to evaluate 
progress towards desired goals, confidence in maintaining progress and so on (e.g. 
George et al., 1999).  These can complement anecdotal observations of the 
practitioner where ‘very concrete stories are provided from multiple sources and for a 
period spanning weeks or months’ (Kazdin, 2006, p.47). 
 
 
Box 1 about here 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
One of the important issues which appears to get lost in the debate about evidence-
based practice is the reason why we need to gather evidence on our interventions.  
Rather than fetishize ‘evidence’ we see the major issue here as about accountability.  
Applied psychologists need to be accountable to a wide variety of stakeholders 
(including the recipients of their services) for what they do and so we need to be able 
to justify and give a theoretically-reasoned rationale for why we have used one 
intervention rather than another.  If we keep this notion in mind it means that we need 
to move beyond narrow modernist conceptions of science in evaluating our work.   
 
In evaluating our theories we also need to draw on ethical principles and criteria to 
orient us to what count as better theories and practices.  Some have argued that we 
need to debate the values that underpin much research and have called for ‘ethics 
before effectiveness’ (Bracken & Thomas, 2000, p.22).  The American social 
constructionist psychologist Ken Gergen has suggested that we need to focus more 
on the usefulness of our theories (Misra, 1993) and Cornish & Gillespie (2009) have 
proposed a pragmatic approach within health psychology. Of course, we also need to 
examine other ways of commissioning research and increasingly researchers are 
looking at partnerships with users of services rather than only with the traditional 
commissioners and purchasers of services (e.g. Faulkner, 2012; Faulkner & Thomas, 
2002; Lindow, 2001; Patel, 1999).  We have argued here that we need to move away 
from simplistic conceptions of evidence-based practice and to seek a more dynamic 
and reflective conceptualisation of the relationship between theory, research and 
practice.  This entails not only developing real-world criteria for evaluating research 
evidence but also different ways of going about the research enterprise itself, 
embracing a pluralistic approach to the selection of methodologies and the kinds of 
evidence gathered.  Only then are we likely to find not just a more effective 
relationship between theory, research and practice, but also a more ethical one. 
 
 
Discussion questions 
 
1. What is ‘evidence-based practice’ and what are its implications for applied 
psychology?   
 
2. What kinds of evidence could psychologists gather apart from that found in 
randomised controlled trials? 
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3. As well as effectiveness, what additional factors might psychologists need to bear 
in mind in making judgements about the appropriateness of particular 
interventions?  How might they go about investigating these factors? 
 
4. What other stakeholders should be considered in carrying out research in applied 
psychology and how might they be involved? 
 
 
 
Further reading 
 
David, T. (Ed) (2001).  Promoting Evidence-based Practice in Early Childhood 
Education: Research and its Implications, Volume 1.  [place of publication please]: 
Elsevier Science.   A good overview of current research in this area. 
 
Clegg, J. (1998).  Critical Issues in Clinical Practice.  London:  Sage.  A critical 
examination of different approaches to thinking about theory, research and 
practice.  Written by a clinical psychologist but easily applicable to other areas 
of applied psychology. 
 
Marks, D.F., Murray, M.P., Evans, B. & Estacio, E.V. (2011).  Health Psychology: 
Theory, Research and Practice (Third edition).  London: Sage. 
An introductory level text to health psychology but with good discussions of 
epistemology, evidence-based practice and critical approaches. 
 
Roth, A. & Fonagy, P. (2006).  What Works for Whom?  A Critical Review of 
Psychotherapy Research.  Second revised edition.  London:  Guilford Press.  A 
thorough overview of psychotherapy research but also includes a 
sophisticated model outlining how practitioners might draw on evidence in 
exercising their professional judgement – written by two clinical psychologists 
but, again applicable to other areas. 
 
Sackett, D.L., Richardson, W.S., Rosenberg, W. & Haynes, R.B.  (1997). Evidence-
Based Medicine: How to Practice and Teach EBM.  London: Churchill Livingstone. 
The classic text on EBM.  Written very much from a medical perspective but 
has lots that will be of interest to any clinician, such as information about 
Number Needed to Treat. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1987).  Educating the Reflective Practitioner.  San Francisco:  Jossey 
Bass.  A good introduction to the reflective practitioner model. 
 
 
Web resources 
 
A useful website on evidence-based practice can be found at: 
http://www.medicine.ox.ac.uk/bandolier/  
 
References 
 
Barkham, M., Shapiro, D.A. & Firth-Cozens, J. (1989).  Personal questionnaire 
changes in prescriptive vs exploratory psychotherapy.  British Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 28, 97-107. 
 12 
 
Bracken, P. & Thomas, P. (2000).  Putting ethics before effectiveness.  Open Mind, 
102, 22. 
 
Cahill, J., Barkham, M. & Stiles, W.B. (2010).  Systematic review of practice based 
research on psychological therapies in routine clinic settings.  British Journal of 
Clinical Psychology, 49, 421-453. 
 
Clegg, J. (1998).  Critical Issues in Clinical Practice.  London:  Sage. 
 
Cornish, F. & Gillespie, A. (2009).  A pragmatist approach to the problem of 
knowledge in health psychology.  Journal of Health Psychology, 14, 800-809. 
 
Coulter, A. & Collins, A. (2011).  Making shared decision-making a reality: no 
decision about me without me.  London: The King's Fund. 
 
Dart, J. & Davies, R. (2003).  A dialogical, story-based evaluation tool: The most 
significant change technique.  American Journal of Evaluation, 24, 137-155. 
 
Davey, M.P., Davey, A., Tubbs, C., Savla, J. & Anderson, S. (in press). Second order 
change and evidence based practice.  Journal of Family Therapy. 
Department of Health (2001).  Treatment choice in psychological therapies and 
counselling. London: HMSO. 
Department of Health (1999).  National Service Framework for Mental Health.  
London:  Department of Health.   
 
Dunsmuir, S., Brown, E.,Iyadurai, S. & Monsen, J. (2009). Evidence-based practice 
and evaluation: From insight to impact. Educational Psychology in Practice. 25, 53 – 
70. 
 
Elliott, R. (2012).  Qualitative methods for studying psychotherapy change processes 
in D. Harper, D. & A. Thompson (Eds.) Qualitative research methods in mental health 
and psychotherapy: an introduction for students and practitioners. Chichester: Wiley. 
 
Falzon, L., Davidson, K.W. & Bruns, D. (2010).  Evidence searching for evidence-
based psychology practice.  Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 41, 
550-557. 
 
Faulkner, A. (2012).  Participation and service user involvement in D. Harper & A. 
Thompson (Eds.) Qualitative research methods in mental health and psychotherapy: 
an introduction for students and practitioners. Chichester: Wiley. 
 
Faulkner, A. & Thomas, P. (2002).  User-led research and evidence-based medicine.  
British Journal of Psychiatry, 180, 1-3. 
 
Frederickson, N. (2002). Evidence-based Practice and Educational Psychology. 
Educational and Child Psychology, 19, 96 – 111. 
 
George, E., Iveson, C. & Ratner, H. (1999).  Problem to solution: Brief therapy with 
individuals and families (Second edition).  London: BT Press. 
 
Guy, A., Thomas, R.,  Stephenson, S. &  Loewenthal, D. (2011).  NICE under 
 13 
scrutiny:  The impact of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
guidelines on the provision of psychotherapy in the UK.  London:  United Kingdom 
Council for Psychotherapy. 
 
Hagstrom, H.P., Fry, M.K.,Cramblet, L.D & Tanner, K (2007) Educational 
psychologists as scientist-practitioners : An expansion of the meaning of a scientist 
practitioner.  American Behavioural Scientist, 50, 797 – 808. 
 
Holmes, G. (2003). An audit: Do the people I see get better? Clinical Psychology, 24, 
47-50. 
 
Holttum, S. & Goble, L. (2006).  Factors influencing levels of research activity in 
clinical psychologists: A new model.  Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 13, 339-
351. 
 
Hoshmand, L.T. & Polkinghorne, D.E. (1992).  Redefining the science-practice 
relationship and professional training.  American Psychologist, 47, 55-66. 
 
John, I. (1998).  The scientist-practitioner model:  A critical examination.  Australian 
Psychologist, 33, 24-30. 
 
Kazdin, A.E. (2006).  Arbitrary metrics: Implications for identifying evidence-based 
treatments.  American Psychologist, 61, 42-49. 
 
Kelly, P. & Moloney, P. (in press).  Psychological therapies.  In J. Cromby, D. Harper 
& P. Reavey Beyond abnormal psychology:  From disorder to experience.  London:  
Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Kennedy, P. & Llewelyn, S. (2001).  Does the future belong to the scientist-
practitioner?  The Psychologist:  Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 14, 74-
78. 
  
Kolb, D.A., Rubin, I.M. & McIntyre, J.M. (1974).  Organizational Psychology:  An 
Experiential Approach.  New Jersey:  Prentice-Hall. 
 
Lane, D.A. & Corrie, S. (eds) (2006).  The modern scientist-practitioner: A guide to 
practice in psychology.  Hove:  Psychology Press. 
 
Larner, G. (2001).  The critical-practitioner model in therapy.  Australian Psychologist, 
36, 36-43. 
 
Learmonth, M. (2006).  NICE Guidelines on Depression: A full digest for Arts 
Therapists. Insider Art, May.  
http://www.insiderart.org.uk/UserFiles/File/The%20NICE%20Guidelines%20on%20D
epression,%20an%20analysis%20from%20an%20art%20therapy%20perspective.pdf
, retrieved 11 May 2011. 
 
Lindow, V. (2001).  Survivor research.  In C. Newnes, G. Holmes & C. Dunn (eds), 
This is Madness Too:  Critical Perspectives on Mental Health Services.  Ross-on-
Wye:  PCCS books. 
 
Long, C.G. & Hollin, C.R. (1997).  The scientist-practitioner model in clinical 
psychology:  A critique.  Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 4, 75-83. 
 
 14 
Longmore, R.J. & Worrell, M. (2007).  Do we need to challenge thoughts in cognitive 
behavior therapy?  Clinical Psychology Review, 27, 173–187. 
McKenna, P., Todd, D. (1997).  Longitudinal utilization of mental health services: A 
timeline method, nine retrospective accounts, and a preliminary conceptualization.  
Psychotherapy Research, 7, 383-395.  
McLeod, J.  (2011).  Chapter 13:  The role of qualitative methods in outcome 
research in Qualitative research in counselling and psychotherapy.  London:  Sage.   
 
Marks, D.F. (2009).  How should psychology interventions be reported?  Journal of 
Health Psychology, 44, 475-489. 
 
Marks, D.F. (2002).  Perspectives on evidence-based practice.  London: National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence.  
http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/whoweare/aboutthehda/evidencebase/publichealthe
videncesteeringgroupproceedings/perspectives_on_evidence_based_practice.jsp 
 
Midlands Psychology Group (2010). Welcome to NICEworld.   Clinical Psychology 
Forum, 212, 52-56. 
Milewa, T. (2006).  Health technology adoption and the politics of governance in the 
UK.  Social Science & Medicine, 63, 3102-3112. 
 
Milewa, T. & Barry, C. (2005).  Health policy and the politics of evidence.  Social 
Policy & Administration, 39, 498-512. 
 
Milne, D. (1999).  Editorial:  Important differences between the ‘scientist-practitioner’ 
and the ‘evidence-based practitioner’.  Clinical Psychology Forum, 133, 5-9. 
 
Milne, D., Keegan, D., Paxton, R. & Seth, K. (2000).  Is the practice of psychological 
therapists evidence-based?  International Journal of Health Care Quality Assurance, 
13, 8-14. 
 
Milne, D., Britton, P. & Wilkinson, I. (1990).  The scientist-practitioner in practice.  
Clinical Psychology Forum, 30, 27-30. 
 
Milne, D. & Paxton, R. (1998).  A psychological reanalysis of the scientist-practitioner 
model.  Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 5, 216-230. 
 
Misra, G. (1993).  Psychology from a constructionist perspective:  An interview with 
Kenneth J. Gergen.  New Ideas in Psychology, 11, 399-414. 
 
Moncrieff, J. (in press).  Psychiatric medication.  In J. Cromby, D. Harper & P. 
Reavey Beyond abnormal psychology:  From disorder to experience.  London:  
Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Murray, M. (2010).  Health psychology in context.  The European Health 
Psychologist, 12, 39-41. 
 
National Institute For Health & Clinical Excellence (2006) Attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD): stakeholder consultation table. London: Author.  
http://www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/live/11632/34228/34228.pdf, retrieved 11 May 
2011. 
 
 15 
Norcross, J.C. & Goldfried, M.R. (eds) (2005).  Handbook of psychotherapy 
integration.  Second edition.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press. 
 
Norcross, J.C., Karpiak, C.P. & Santoro, S.O. (2005).  Clinical psychologists across 
the years: The Division of Clinical Psychology from 1960 to 2003.  Journal of Clinical 
Psychology, 61, 1467-1483. 
 
Norcross, J.C., Brust, A.M. & Dryden, W. (1992).  British clinical psychologists:  II.  
Survey findings and American comparisons.  Clinical Psychology Forum, 40, 25-29. 
 
Paley, G., & Shapiro, D. A. (2002). Lessons from psychotherapy research for 
psychological interventions for people with schizophrenia. Psychology & 
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice, 75, 5–17. 
 
Patel, N. (1999).  Getting the Evidence:  Guidelines for Ethical Mental Health 
Research Involving Issues of ‘Race’, Ethnicity and Culture.  London:  
MIND/Transcultural Psychiatry Society (UK). 
 
Pembroke, L (undated).  Politicising self-harm.  
http://www.soteria.freeuk.com/pembroke-jul.htm, retrieved 11 May 2011. 
 
Perkins, R. (2001).  What constitutes success?  British Journal of Psychiatry, 179, 9-
10. 
 
Pilgrim, D. & Treacher, A. (1992).  Clinical Psychology Observed.  London:  
Routledge. 
 
Prochaska, J.O. & Norcross, J.C. (2009).  Systems of psychotherapy:  A 
transtheoretical analysis, 7th edition.  Pacific Grove, CA:  Brooks/Cole Pub Co. 
 
Pugh, J, (2010). Cognitive behaviour Therapy in schools : the role of educational 
psychology in the dissemination of empirically supported interventions.  Educational 
Psychology in Practice, 26, 391-99. 
 
Rogers, E.S., Chamberlin, J., Ellison, M.L., Crean, T. (1997).  A consumer-
constructed scale to measure empowerment among users of mental health services.  
Psychiatric Services, 48, 1042-1047. 
 
Rose, D., Fleischmann, P., Wykes, T., Leese, M. & Bindman, J. (2003).  Patients' 
perspectives on electroconvulsive therapy: systematic review.  British Medical 
Journal, 326, 1363. 
 
Rose, D., Thornicroft, G. & Slade, M. (2006).  Who decides what evidence is? 
Developing a multiple perspectives paradigm in mental health.  Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 113, 109-114. 
 
Roth, T. (1999).  Evidence-based practice:  Is there a link between research and 
practice?  Clinical Psychology Forum, 133, 37-40. 
 
Roth, A. & Fonagy, P. (2006).  What works for whom?  A critical review of 
psychotherapy research.  Second revised edition.  London:  Guilford Press. 
 
Roy-Chowdhury, S. (2003).  Knowing the unknowable:  What constitutes evidence in 
family therapy?  Journal of Family Therapy, 25, 64-85. 
 
 16 
Sackett, D.L., Rosenberg, W.M.C., Gray, J.A.M., Haynes, R.B. & Richardson, W.S. 
(1996). Evidence-based medicine: what it is and what it isn’t. British Medical Journal, 
312, 71-2. 
 
Schön, D.A. (1987).  Educating the Reflective Practitioner.  San Francisco:  Jossey 
Bass. 
 
Shapiro, D.A. & Paley, G.  (2002). Invited rejoinder:  The continuing potential 
relevance of equivalence and allegiance to research on psychological treatment of 
psychosis.  Psychology & Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice, 75, 375–
379. 
 
Shapiro, M.B. (1961).  A method of measuring psychological changes specific to the 
individual psychiatric patient.  British Journal of Medical Psychology, 34, 151-155. 
 
Shearer Underhill, C. & Marker, C. (2010).  The use of the number needed to treat 
(NNT) in randomized clinical trials in psychological treatment.  Clinical Psychology: 
Science and Practice, 17, 41-47. 
 
Stedmon, J. & Dallos, R. (Eds.) (2009).  Reflective practice in psychotherapy and 
counselling. Maidenhead: Open University Press. 
 
Stevens, A. (2011). Telling policy stories: An ethnographic study of the use of 
evidence in policy-making in the UK. Journal of Social Policy, 40, 237-256.  
 
Stiles, D. A. & Stiles, W.B. (1989).  Abuse of the drug metaphor in psychotherapy 
process-outcome research.  Clinical Psychology Review, 9, 521-54. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011).  World military spending 
reached $1.6 trillion in 2010, biggest increase in South America, fall in Europe 
according to new SIPRI data, 11 April 2011.  Retrieved on 16 August 2011 from:  
http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/milex 
Tarrier, N., Haddock, G., Barrowclough, C., & Wykes, T. (2002). Are all psychological 
treatments for psychosis equal?  The need for CBT in the treatment of psychosis and 
not for psychodynamic psychotherapy: Invited commentary Paley and Shapiro. 
Psychology & Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice, 75, 365–374. 
 
Tyrer, P., Duggan, C., Cooper, S., Crawford, M., Seivewright, H., Rutter, D., Maden, 
T., Byford, S. & Barrett, B. (2010).  The successes and failures of the DSPD 
experiment: the assessment and management of severe personality disorder.  
Medicine, Science and the Law, 50, 95-99. 
 
Winter, D. (2010).  Editorial for special Issue: Researcher allegiance in the 
psychological therapies.  European Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling, 12, 3-9. 
 
 
 17 
Box 1 
 
An example of the use of evidence in practice:  Using of CBT with a pupil in 
danger of exclusion from school 
 
Kevin is a 14year old boy in secondary school, nearing the end of Year 9.  He has 
struggled to accept school rules throughout the current year and the advent of GCSE 
subject choice has brought the issues regarding ‘rules’ to the fore.  Despite parental 
commitment to the school and a focus on academic success within the family, Kevin 
sees the solution to his current unhappiness as a change of school.  At times when 
this has not been supported by parents or school, Kevin has withdrawn his 
cooperation in both settings and his challenging behaviour has resulted in a number 
of fixed term exclusions. 
 
Kevin was raised as a priority concern during consultation with the educational 
psychologist working with the school. At a joint school and family meeting Kevin’s 
parents reported their incomprehension regarding the change in Kevin’s behaviour 
over the past year, the constant arguments and his apparent unreasonable 
resistance to all school rules. A period of direct involvement was agreed and CBT 
was proposed as the intervention most suited to bringing about a change in Kevin’s 
relationships with adults at home and in school.  CBT had been used with a number 
of pupils in the school following a review of its effectiveness  (Pugh, 2010).  A 
number of factors indicated that it might be an appropriate intervention here.  For 
example, it was important for any intervention to be short term and CBT offered this.  
Moreover, it seemed to be important for Kevin to have an opportunity to identify links 
between his thoughts, feelings and behaviour so that he could then develop 
alternative strategies and so avoid further exclusions from school and CBT appeared 
to offer this. 
 
Over a period of seven weeks, Kevin met with the educational psychologists on five 
occasions and together they explored his perception of how decisions were made 
regarding expectations of behaviour and his role in the process.  It transpired that 
Kevin saw all adults as having the freedom to make choices whereas he saw them 
withholding a similar right from children.  He saw this control by adults as insulting to 
his developing maturity and thus tended to rebel against rules. The sessions with 
Kevin focused on inviting him to notice rules across society and not just in school.  
For example, he was encouraged to take note of the rules governing the behaviour of 
respected role models in the community and the media.  He also identified the 
personal rules he would apply if given the opportunity.  He also examined the long 
term consequences of taking an oppositional approach to rules in both school and 
home. 
 
Part of the awareness that governed change in Kevin’s approach was the realisation  
that both at home and in school, all activities included both choices and rules (either 
self or other imposed).  Moreover, an important element of freedom was the ability to 
choose to abide by certain rules.  Of course, not all rules are of equal status and 
Kevin began to identify those which were negotiable and those that needed to be 
adhered to for practical and pragmatic reasons.  Now in year 10, Kevin has moved to 
the upper area of the school and is engaged in his GCSE studies.  He continues to 
work on negotiating his choices with parents and school but has accommodated to 
the notion of negotiation rather than resistance as an indicator of maturity and 
respect. 
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Figure 2 
 
Type I evidence:  at least one good systematic review and at least one 
randomised controlled trial.  
Type II evidence:  at least one good randomised controlled trial. 
Type III evidence:  at least one well-designed intervention study without 
randomisation. 
Type IV evidence:  at least one well-designed observational study. 
Type V evidence:  expert opinion, including the opinion of service users and 
carers.  
       (DoH, 1999, p.6) 
 
